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The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with
each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them,
but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of others, in a strategic forward
looking manner. Game theory of repeated games shows that these circumstances are con-
ducive to the emergence of collaboration in simple games of two players. We investigate
the extension of this concept to the case where players are engaged in a local contribution
game and show that rationality and credibility of threats identify a class of Nash equilibria
– that we call “collaborative equilibria” – that have a precise interpretation in terms of
sub-graphs of the social network. For large network games, the number of such equilib-
ria is exponentially large in the number of players. When incentives to defect are small,
equilibria are supported by local structures whereas when incentives exceed a threshold
they acquire a non-local nature, which requires a “critical mass” of more than a given
fraction of the players to collaborate. Therefore, when incentives are high, an individual
deviation typically causes the collapse of collaboration across the whole system. At the
same time, higher incentives to defect typically support equilibria with a higher density of
collaborators. The resulting picture conforms with several results in sociology and in the
experimental literature on game theory, such as the prevalence of collaboration in denser
groups and in the structural hubs of sparse networks.
The social network influences and constrains in non-trivial ways the behavior of individuals (1)
but also contributes to aspects generically referred to as social capital (2; 3; 4), which favor the
emergence of coordinated actions or collaboration1.
The theoretical investigation about the emergence of collaboration and the fate of repeated
actions on networks has, up to now, mostly focused on adaptive learning, imitation and evolutionary
game theory. The corresponding theoretical models (6; 7; 8; 9; 10) seem to suggest that sustaining
collaboration is easier on sparse networks and spatial structures than on dense groups. On the
1 We will explicitly refer to this endogenous profitable mutual exchange as collaboration, and not as cooperation, to
stress the fact that it emerges from individual opportunistic incentives and not from group–based profit maximiza-
tion, as in the cooperative games already introduced in (5).
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2contrary, there is no clear experimental evidence of such an effect. Results of recent experiments
on voluntary contribution suggest instead that the establishment and maintenance of collaboration
is easier on well connected groups than on sparse graphs (11; 12; 13), in some ways confirming
the intuition behind the classical Coleman’s closure argument (14). The picture becomes more
complex as we move to analyze individual positions in the network: Experiments performed on
star-shaped groups suggest that central nodes are fostered to collaborate more than peripherals
(13), corroborating another well-known idea, i.e. Burt’s argument on the importance of structural
holes (15).
However, the network is not only the channel for the achievement of payoffs or the exchange
of information, which are the key ingredients of learning and imitative behavior. The network
also supports the establishment of trust, norms, contracts and other continuative collaborative
relations in which the temporal dimension is crucial. In fact, a key aspect of a social network is
that individuals connected by a link interact repeatedly with each other, calling into play forward
looking strategic behavior typical of the theory of repeated games. This provides a formal framework
for concepts such as threats, punishment and credibility, which have been so enlightening on the
emergence of collaboration in simple setups (e.g. the prisoner’s dilemma) (16).
Here we investigate the extension of the theory of repeated games to network games. We focus on
simple local contribution games which provide a perfect framework to highlight the main conceptual
issues, and are closely linked to experimental works on voluntary contribution (11; 12; 13; 17).
We start from the assumption, largely verified experimentally (see for instance Ref. (17)), that
collaboration can be sustained only through a reciprocal relation of control and punishment, which
plays an essential role in the theory of two-person repeated games (16). It follows that collaboration
becomes conditional, i.e. an agent collaborates only if her peers also collaborate. We show that,
in a multi-player setting, rationality imposes conditional collaboration to be i) reciprocal and ii)
player-specific: Controlling only a subset of neighbors is enough to guarantee collaboration, and
credibility of threats dictates that punishment should be limited to the minimal subset of neighbors
which supports collaboration as a best response. These requirements identify a refinement of Nash
equilibria, that we call Collaborative Equilibria, with a precise graph-theoretical interpretation.
This turns the problem of finding and characterizing Nash equilibria into that of finding specific
sub-graphs of the social network, which can be addressed by graph theoretical methods (18; 19),
and it provides considerable insight on the nature of possible collaborative structures which can
be supported, depending on incentives and on the topology of the social network. In particular, we
find that when the contribution cost is low, collaboration can be sustained by local commitments
3(corresponding to dimers or loops on the network). But when costs are high, collaboration requires
non-local structures which span a finite fraction of the system. This has clear implications in terms
of systemic fragility, because when costs are high a single individual defection may bring to the
collapse of the whole collaborative network.
Our analysis of Collaborative Equilibria on ensembles of random graphs unveils a generic picture
which, as will be discussed in the closing section, has many correspondences with well known results
in sociology and in experimental economics.
I. A REPEATED GAME OF LOCAL CONTRIBUTION
We focus on a class of local contribution games, recently popularized in Refs. (17; 20), which
have the peculiarity that only the neighbors of a contributor and not the contributor herself benefit
of the positive effects of a contribution. In this regard, we can interpret these local contribution
games as a simple extension of the celebrated prisoners’ dilemma to the case where there are more
than two players, where the range of possible interactions between individuals is limited only to
local ones by a fixed network structure, and where agents play the same strategy against each
neighbor.
A. The Model
Players occupy the nodes N of an undirected social network and they interact with their neigh-
bors in a local contribution game. Specifically, each player i ∈ N has the option of either con-
tributing (si = 1) or not (si = 0) to a local public good that has effect only on the neighbors of i
in Ni.
2 Contributing is costly, which means that players who contribute incur a cost Xi > 0. At
the same time, each player receives a unitary payoff from all agents j ∈ Ni who contribute in her
neighborhood. The payoff function of agent i is then given by
pii(si, s−i) = −Xisi +
∑
j∈Ni
sj (1)
where s−i stands for the vector of choices of all other players, except i. It is clear that, in the single
stage game, a positive si is only a cost for player i, and hence defection (i.e. si = 0) is a dominant
strategy for all Xi > 0: pii(0, s−i) > pii(1, s−i). If the game is played just once, the unique Nash
2 We adopt the notation (N, ~N) to specify the social network, where N is the set of nodes and the ith element of ~N ,
denoted Ni, is the subset of the neighbors of i (i 6∈ Ni. The social network is undirected: i ∈ Nj implies j ∈ Ni).
4equilibrium is one where si = 0 for all i ∈ N . When players are engaged in repeated plays of the
game, with the same opponents, a much richer set of outcomes is possible. Indeed, a continuum
set of outcomes can be sustained as Nash equilibria (16).
Let the game above be played repeatedly at discrete times t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . and let s
(t)
i be the
option taken by agent i at time t. A strategy now becomes an action plan σi = {s(t)i , t = 0, 1, 2, . . .},
which specifies the behavior of agent i at all times. In particular, s
(t)
i may be any function of the
opponents’ behavior s
(t′)
−i in the previous stage games t
′ < t. The payoff function is generalized to
an inter-temporal utility function
ui(σi, σ−i) = (1− δ)
∑
t≥0
pi
(
s
(t)
i , s
(t)
−i
)
δt (2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the factor by which agents discount future payoffs with respect to present ones.
For δ → 0 the game reverts to the single stage game with the unique non-collaborative equilibrium.
The limit δ → 1 of (temporally) very far-sighted players is instead much more interesting, because
players can choose from a huge (a priori infinite) space of possible strategies.
B. Trigger Strategies
To attack this problem, we start considering the simpler and well-known situation of a two-
player game, where enforceable payoffs can be attained as Nash equilibria by reducing the set of
possible strategies to a particular subset, known as trigger strategies (21). Trigger strategies encode
the idea of punishment: agent i collaborates a priori, but if her opponent j misbehaves (i.e. s
(t)
j = 0
for some t ≥ 0), she will punish her with defective behavior for the infinite future (i.e. s(t′)i = 0
for all t′ > t). If the opponent is “threatened” in this way, her best reply, if δ is large enough and
Xi < 1, is to collaborate, or equivalently to use the same trigger strategy. This in fact guarantees
the collaboration payoff 1 −Xi > 0 in each round, as opposed to the zero payoff she would get if
both defected. A crucial issue is that threats of punishment must be credible: a rational opponent
will not consider credible a trigger strategy that inflicts a payoff loss to the player herself.
How does this insight carries over to multi–player settings, where players interact with their
neighbors on the network? It is instructive to consider the case of three players, without loss of
generality call them 1, 2 and 3, all connected together in a closed triangle 3, with Xi < 1. Imagine
3 From now on, for the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we focus on the limit δ → 1 where the utility
is dominated by the asymptotic behavior of players. Each statement derived for δ → 1 will be true for a δ < 1,
which is large enough.
5that players 1 and 2 are both using trigger strategies, making their collaboration conditional on the
collaboration of the others. How should player 3 behave? If she takes the threat of other players
seriously, then she will also collaborate. But should she consider their threat credible? No, because
if player 3 were to defect, and both 1 and 2 also turn to defection, they would get a payoff of zero,
whereas if they were to continue collaborating they would get a payoff of 1−Xi > 0 in each stage
game. Hence the threat of players 1 and 2 is not credible and player 3 better defects, free–riding
with a payoff of 2. On the contrary, if we assume Xi > 1 ∀i then full collaboration is individually
rational and can be sustained in the repeated game as a Nash equilibrium outcome by means of
credible threats. This example points out that generalizing trigger strategies entails making the
strategies conditional on the behavior of a subset of the players: for Xi < 1, player 1 will punish
player 2 but not player 3, because only one collaborator is needed in the neighborhood to make
collaboration the best choice. In other words, control by punishment is player-specific4.
Also, the same arrangement of players shows that punishment should be reciprocal. Imagine
a situation where player 1 punishes 2, 2 punishes 3 and 3 punishes 1. Should 3 abide to this
arrangement? No. Again if she decides to defect, she may argue that it is not credible that 2 will
punish her, because again 2 would end up with a lower payoff (zero) than what she would get by
continuing collaborating with 1.
C. Collaborative Equilibria
These considerations generalize naturally to a notion of Nash equilibrium sustained by trigger
strategies for a general network, with the three conditions that punishment must be (1) credible,
(2) player-specific, and (3) reciprocal. Let σ = 0 be the “always defect” strategy and τ(∆) be a
trigger strategy, conditional on the behavior of agents j ∈ ∆ ⊆ N . An agent playing τ(∆) will
collaborate as long as all agents in ∆ also collaborate. Let C ⊆ N be the subset of agents who
play trigger strategies, whereas agents i 6∈ C always defect (σ = 0). Individuals are only allowed
to control their neighbors, i.e. if i ∈ C plays τ(∆i), then ∆i ⊆ Ni. It is convenient to introduce
also the set of punishers of i ∈ C, which is Γi = {j : i ∈ ∆j} ⊆ C ∩ Ni. Then let ci = |C ∩ Ni|
be the number of collaborators in i’s neighborhood and γi = |Γi| be the number of punishers of i.
We assume that agents are (spatially) nearsighted in that, in considering the effect of deviations,
they only consider direct effects of punishment. Effects due to loops in cascades of defections and
4 This notion was already implicitly present in several multi-player generalization of the Prisoner’s Dilemma intro-
duced to study the free-riding problem in groups of individuals (22).
6punishments are neglected5. Under these assumptions, we define the following refinement of Nash
equilibria in the repeated local contribution game,
Proposition 1 (Collaborative Equilibria) The arrangement where, for all i ∈ C, Xi ≤ γi <
Xi + 1 and Γi = ∆i, is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game of nearsighted agents, for a
sufficiently large discount factor δ.
Proof: If player i ∈ C deviates by defecting, she can expect to receive a payoff per period of ci−γi.
If this is less than the payoff ci−Xi she gets by collaborating, then deviation is unprofitable. This
occurs if γi ≥ Xi, which is the first inequality in the proposition. Now, let i, j ∈ C be neighbors and
let j 6∈ Γi defect. Then, if i continues to collaborate, her payoff is ci − 1−Xi whereas by defecting
i gets ci − 1 − γi (note that since j 6∈ Γi the value of γi does not change). If i was collaborating
before, i.e. if γi ≥ Xi, then i should continue collaborating, which means that i should not punish
j, i.e. j 6∈ ∆i or i 6∈ Γj . As a consequence i ∈ Γj implies j ∈ Γi, or Γi = ∆i, because otherwise the
argument above would produce a contradiction. Finally, let i ∈ Γj . If j defects, i should punish
her, i.e. i should also stop collaborating. This means that i’s payoff to collaborate (ci − 1 − Xi)
should be less that the payoff to defect, which is ci − 1 − (γi − 1), because j ∈ Γi. This implies
γi < Xi + 1 which is the second part of the inequality in the proposition. 
Note that the assumption on spatial nearsightedness is not relevant for the incentive to collab-
orate. In other words, if γi > Xi then collaborating would still be the best option if some other
neighbors of i 6∈ Γi would also stop collaborating, as a consequence of indirect cascades of punish-
ments. On the contrary, a situation where players were able to anticipate indirect defections may
entail non-reciprocal control6. Here, the assumption that agents cannot compute indirect effects of
punishment is crucial.
Collaborative equilibria are a particular subset of all the Nash equilibria which can be supported
by trigger strategies7. Here we keep the sophistication of the game theoretic treatment to a minimal
5 The defection of an agent i or of one of its neighbors, could generate a cascade of defections due to punishment,
which might lead also agents j ∈ Ni\Γi to defect. Such indirect effects of punishment only occur if there are loops
in the social network. If the social network is a tree, deviation of a neighbor of i cannot have effects on other
neighbors of i, if not through a change of i’s behavior. Hence nearsightedness is equivalent to assuming lack of
common knowledge beyond the immediate neighborhood: players know only their neighbors and how many players
each of them is interacting with.
6 Consider for example the case where j 6∈ Γi defects, and as a result of this k ∈ Γi also defects in order to punish
j or some other neighbor. If i continues collaborating she gets ci − 2 − Xi whereas if she defects her payoff is
ci − 2 − (γi − 1). Not punishing is not rational because ci − 2 −Xi > ci − 1 − γi cannot be satisfied if Xi ≥ γi.
Hence i ∈ Γj .
7 It is possible to show that these equilibria can be defined as the equilibria of similar games with the same payoffs
(23; 24). For this we refer to a companion paper (25).
7level and we focus, instead, on the aspects related to the structure of collaborative equilibria and
their computational complexity. In this respect, we note that a direct consequence of Proposition
1 is that it turns the characterization of Nash equilibria into a graph theoretical problem:
Corollary 2 Every Collaborative Equilibrium of the local contribution game identifies a subgraph
(C, ~Γ) of the social network (N, ~N), with C ⊆ N , Γi ⊆ Ni and |Γi| being the smallest integer larger
than Xi. Every subgraph (C, ~Γ) with these properties supports a Nash equilibrium where players
i ∈ C collaborate (s(t)i = 1) and players not in C defect (s(t)i = 0).
II. THE COMPLEXITY OF COLLABORATION ON NETWORKS
How many collaborative equilibria exist on a given social network and how does this number
depends on the number of players, the payoffs and the network structure? How much hard is
it to compute an equilibrium? How does the equilibrium “respond” to local perturbations? The
mapping of collaborative equilibria to collections of possibly disconnected subgraphs of a given
socio-economic network allows us to address a number of questions. Some of these can be answered
in very general terms: For example, if 0 < Xi < 1 ∀i, the subgraphs which support collaborative
equilibria are collections of disjoint “dimers” (see Fig. 1 left). The number of dimer covers is
generically expected to increase exponentially with the size of the network, and local deviations
have only local effects, as the defection of one player affects at most the behavior of the other player
on the same dimer. If 1 < Xi < 2 collaborative equilibria coincide with configurations of loops on
the social network and larger Xi entail more complex structures (see Fig. 1 right). Correspondingly,
the answer to the questions above becomes non-trivial. Also, the problem of finding subgraphs of
a given network can be computationally very hard8, but it is typically very easy for dimers and
loops, or for specific classes of graphs, such as planar graphs.
A. Collaborative Equilibria on Random Graphs
Quantitative predictions are possible for networks which are drawn from ensembles of random
graphs. For large network sizes (|N | → ∞) several properties attain a limit which is independent of
the particular realization of the social network. We refer to these as typical properties, i.e. properties
which are expected to hold with high probability for large networks. The local tree-like structure of
8 For instance, in the case of random regular subgraphs, i.e. γi = γ ∀i, the problem is known to be NP-complete on
general graphs (26).
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FIG. 1 Example of collaborative equilibria for N = 40 players on a regular random graph (|Ni| = K = 4)
with 0 < Xi < 1,∀i (left) and 2 < Xi < 3,∀i (right) ). Defectors are in black whereas collaborators are
in yellow. Thick links are those between players who collaborate conditionally on each other (i ∈ Γj and
j ∈ Γi).
large graphs with a finite degree makes the characterization of typical behavior tractable by means
of message passing techniques (19), such as Belief Propagation (BP), which are exact on trees and
are approximately correct also for finite, moderately clustered graphs. The theoretical treatment is
formally the same as in (27; 28; 29), which have considered similar graph-theoretic problems9. BP
allows one to derive results on ensembles of graphs in the limit |N | → ∞ (19) but it also provides
efficient heuristic algorithms to find collaborative equilibria on given graph instances (30; 31). The
messages which are exchanged in the BP algorithm are the probabilities µi→j = P{i ∈ Γj
⋂
C}
that player i collaborates and punishes j, in the collaborative equilibrium10. These probabilities,
are updated through the equation (28)
µi→j =
e−Zγi−1Ni\j→i
Z0Ni\j→i + e
−Zγi−1Ni\j→i + e
−ZγiNi\j→i
(3)
where, for any integer q and subset V ⊆ N ,
ZqV→i =
∑
U⊆V
I|U |=q
∏
j∈U
µj→i
∏
k∈V/U
(1− µk→i) (4)
9 All results presented here are obtained in the so-called replica-symmetric ansatz, that is under the assumption that
the statistical properties of the equilibria are described by a unique Gibbs measure. This assumption is not always
strictly correct, because the organization of the space of solutions could be more complex (18). A signature that
replica-symmetry could be a wrong assumption is provided by the stability of the BP fixed point. On single graph
instances, this corresponds to the convergence of BP messages. In fact, we have observed that the BP equations
are not always stable in the full range of values assumed by .
10 In the sub-graph problem, this is the probability that the link (i, j) is part of the sub-graph, in the modified graph
in which the link from i to j is removed. On trees, this operation disconnects the graph in subtrees.
9and the indicator function I|U |=q restricts the sum only to subsets of q elements. In words, the
numerator in the r.h.s. of Eq. (3), which is based on Eq. (4), asserts that i should control j if
there are γi − 1 other players k 6= j who control i. The denominator expresses the fact that,
in a collaborative equilibrium, three situations are possible: 1) i 6∈ C, and hence i needs not be
controlled by any neighbor, 2) i ∈ Γj and i ∈ C, or 3) i 6∈ Γj and i ∈ C, i.e. i is already controlled
by γi neighbors and does not need to control j. The parameter  ∈ (−∞,+∞) is a statistical weight
for collaborators, which is introduced to bias the distribution over equilibria towards those with a
higher ( < 0) or lower ( > 0) density of collaborators. The probability P{i ∈ C} that a player
i collaborates or the probability P{i ∈ Γj} that players i, j ∈ C conditionally collaborate can be
expressed in terms of the solution {µi→j} of the set of equations (3-4) as follows
P{i ∈ C} = e
−ZγiNi→i
Z0Ni→i + e
−ZγiNi→i
(5)
P{i ∈ Γj} = µi→jµj→i
µi→jµj→i + (1− µi→j)(1− µj→i) . (6)
In practice, Eqs. (3-4) can be iterated on a specific graph, substituting the value µi→j with
the value of the function on the r.h.s., until a fixed point is reached, which is guaranteed to occur
on tree-like structures (19). The fixed point, however, is not unique. Indeed, for any collaborative
equilibrium (C, ~Γ), binary messages µi→j = Ii∈Γj ⋂C ∀i, j are a solution of the BP equations. These
“pure strategy” fixed points coexist with an internal solution, akin to a ”mixed strategy” fixed point.
As in similar problems (29), the BP iteration converges to the internal solution, and makes possible
a series of estimates on the statistical properties of the problem. In particular, we can compute the
number N (ρ) of collaborative equilibria as a function of the density of collaborators ρ = |C|/|N | '∑
i∈N P{i ∈ C}/|N |. For large population size |N |, the number of equilibria is, to leading order,
exponentially large in |N |, and one can define the entropy function s(ρ) = lim|N |→∞ 1|N | logN (ρ).
Similarly, one can study the entropy of collaborative equilibria as a function of other parameters
of the problem (e.g. costs of contribution) or topological property (e.g. average degree). Moreover,
simple adaptations of the message-passing algorithm, e.g. by iteratively fixing some variables (BP-
decimation (30)) or by introducing self-consistent biases on the messages (BP-reinforcement (31)),
can be used to converge towards specific pure-strategy equilibria. In this respect, varying  allows
for searching collaborative equilibria with a given average density of collaborators ρ.
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FIG. 2 Entropy s(ρ) as a function of density ρ of collaborators for γ = dXe = 1, 2 and 3 on regular random
graph with |Ni| = K = 4. Results are derived analytically for |N | → ∞ as e.g. in Ref. (29).
B. Results
A clear picture of the properties of collaborative equilibria can be obtained considering the
conceptually simple situation of regular subgraphs of random regular graphs. It corresponds to
assume a uniform cost, i.e. Xi = X ∀i, hence γi = γ = dXe, ∀i. Examples of collaborative
equilibria obtained by means of the BP-decimation algorithm on a random regular graph of degree
|Ni| = K = 4 are reported in Fig. 1. This suggests that the density of collaborators ρ increases with
the cost Xi. This conclusion is also supported by the behavior of the entropy s(ρ), shown in Fig. 2.
This attains a maximum at a value ρtyp of the density of collaborators, which implies that, for
large |N |, almost all equilibria have ρ ' ρtyp. Fig. 2 shows that ρtyp increases with Xi, suggesting
that higher costs enforce higher densities of collaborators. This is an apparently counterintuitive
result that has however a simple explanation in the context of the model. An agent collaborates
only as long as there are enough neighbors around her that also collaborate, and that would punish
her defecting if she defects: the higher the cost of collaboration, the more profitable it would be to
defect, but hence also the more collaborating neighbors are needed to balance this incentive.
A remarkable feature of Fig. 2 is that while for γ = 1 and 2 equilibria exist for all densities ρ
of collaborators (i.e. s(ρ) > 0,∀ρ ∈ (0, 1]), for γ = 3 equilibria only exist for ρ ≥ ρc ≈ 0.8. This
reflects the fact that for γ = 1, collaborative equilibria are collections of “dimers” of collaborators
who reciprocally control each others in pairs. For γ = 2, equilibria are collections of loops, whose
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FIG. 3 (Left) Density ρtyp of collaborators in a typical equilibrium in Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs as function of
the average degree 〈k〉 for x = 0.1 (black circles) and 0.5 (red squares). The inset shows the corresponding
typical entropies smax = s(ρtyp). (Right) Probability PC(k) (red squares) that a node of degree |Ni| = k
collaborates in a typical collaborative equilibrium (ρtyp) and low marginal cost (x = 0.05) on an uncorrelated
scale-free random graph of size |N | = 5 · 103 with degree distribution P (k) ∝ k−2.5 for 2 ≤ k ≤ 70 (blue
circles).
typical size in a sparse random graph is O(log |N |). For large graphs, collaborative equilibria with
γi = 1 or 2 can be constructed adding and removing dimers or loops, adjusting the density ρ in a
continuous manner in (0, 1]. For γ = 3, instead, collaboration requires the formation of a regular
subgraph of degree 3, which is only possible if more than a fraction ρc of the nodes are involved.
Hence collaborative equilibria do not exist for ρ < ρc, and when they emerge (for ρ > ρc), they are
exponentially many and they span a large fraction of the network. This has clear implications for
the systemic stability of collaborative equilibria: while a local deviation for γ < 3 only entails local
rearrangements, for γ ≥ 3 it is likely to cause the collapse of the whole collaborative structure.
Hence collaborative equilibria acquire a non-local character whereby the fate of agreements in a
neighborhood depends on what happens in distant regions of the social network. Such systemic
fragility has its roots in the organization of the space of equilibria. Collaborative equilibria are
formally obtained as solutions of constraint satisfaction problems (CSP) that belong to the class of
locked CSP, recently introduced in Ref.(29). In these CSP, if one modifies one variable in a solution,
the rearrangement required to find another solution propagates across the network possibly affecting
a sizable part of it. Here, for γ < 3, the shift from a given equilibrium to another one involves the
rearrangement of at most O(log |N |) nodes, i.e. a negligible fraction of the system. On the contrary,
for γ ≥ 3 the minimal distance between two equilibria is proportional to the number |N | of nodes.
All the instances which have been analyzed confirmed the following set of generic features: i) on
average the typical fraction ρtyp of collaborators increases with costs; ii) the absence of equilibria
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at small densities ρ for large costs; and iii) their fragility w.r.t. small perturbations and non-local
character, for sufficiently large costs. These include Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and scale free random graphs, with
fixed costs Xi = X (see also (28)) and with costs of collaboration Xi = x|Ni| that are proportional
to the number of neighbors each player interacts with. In the latter case, when the marginal cost x
is small, equilibria are mainly formed by dimers and loops and can be found for any density ρ. When
x is large, non-trivial collaborative equilibria only exist for sufficiently large density of collaborators
ρ, reproducing the “critical mass” effect observed in regular random graphs. Interestingly, when
the marginal cost exceeds a graph-dependent threshold xc (xc ' 0.79 for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random
graphs with average degree equal to 4), the number of equilibria vanishes in the full range of ρ (i.e.
s(ρ) < 0), suggesting that the only possible equilibria are the all-defect or the fully collaborative
(for x = 1) ones.
In addition, we also found that iv) increasing the average degree promotes collaboration on
average, because denser graphs admit typical equilibria of larger density ρtyp of collaborators, as
shown in Fig. 3(left) for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs. The monotonic behavior of s(ρtyp) with
graph density (see the inset) is an evidence of the fact that in denser graphs there are much more
possible ways of arranging a collaborating subgraph. Finally, we found that v) within a collaborative
equilibrium, the more neighbors a player has, the more she is likely to collaborate (see Fig. 3 right).
Social networks are far from being uncorrelated. Therefore it is important to consider the role
played by degree correlations. To this end, we have generated assortative/disassortative networks
starting from uncorrelated ones by means of a link-exchange Monte Carlo algorithm proposed in
Ref. (32). The corresponding curves s(ρ) computed for a moderate contribution cost x = 0.1 are
displayed in Fig. 4. Our results suggest that vi) positive degree–correlation favors collaboration
in that, the number of collaborative equilibria s(ρ) and the typical fraction of collaborators ρtyp
increases with degree correlation. Remarkably, in strongly disassortative networks, collaboration
can be suppressed altogether for large ρ (see Fig. 4).
III. DISCUSSION
Experiments suggest that, apart from a very small fraction of innate altruists, most individuals
are self-interested, hence they rationally condition their own collaboration to that of their peers
(33). However, in order to sustain conditional collaboration over time in a social group, credible
punishment is necessary. In a network setting, we find out that agents condition their behavior
only on those neighbors that are strictly necessary to get a higher payoff from collaborating than
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FIG. 4 Entropy s(ρ) as a function of density ρ of collaborators on correlated scale-free random graphs. We
first considered an uncorrelated network (J = 0 in Eq. 9 of Ref.(32)) of |N | = 5 · 103 nodes, with degree
distribution P (k) ∝ k−2.5 for 2 ≤ k ≤ 70 (black line and •). Then we generated assortative/disassortative
networks from this network, by means of a link-exchange Monte Carlo algorithm proposed in Ref. (32), with
positive (J = 0.1, triangles) and negative (J = −1, squares) degree-correlation. The cost is Xi = x|Ni| with
x = 0.1.
from defecting, i.e. punishment is player-specific. Immediately we find that control relationships
between the agents have also to be reciprocal. Reciprocity is a familiar concept in the context of
repeated games, especially in evolutionary game theory. In this respect, it is worth noting that
our conditions to sustain collaboration completely agree with the concept of “network reciprocity”
introduced by Ohtsuki et al. (9), although resulting from a different assumption from our forward–
looking rationality. Moreover, collaborative equilibria define a subgraph of pairwise interactions that
reminds endogenous network formation games, in which stable coalitions depend on the existence
of reciprocal pairwise interactions (34; 35). Simply enforcing these three assumptions by means of
trigger strategies on a repeated local contribution game on networks, we obtain our main conceptual
result: collaboration can be described in terms of a purely graph theoretical problem. We have called
“collaborative equilibria” the corresponding class of Nash equilibrium refinements.
This approach shows that the contribution cost (incentive to defect) has a major effect on
the structure of the equilibria. When it is small, agents exert a low control on the neighbors and
collaboration can be easily sustained in a repeated game. Increasing the cost/incentive, the system
develops strong long-range correlations and collaboration may require a critical mass. Here, the
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absence of equilibria with low density of collaborators evokes Oliver and Marwell’s “critical mass
theory”, which is one of the most celebrated theories of collective actions (36). This maintains
that simultaneous coordination of a sufficiently large subset of individuals is one of the possible
solutions of the free-riding problem in situations in which individual contribution is extremely
disadvantageous. Here we show that the existence of a critical mass emerges naturally from simple
interaction, without the need of artificially introducing a threshold in the behavior of the agents.
In this cases, collaboration is very fragile and, even if there are exponentially many equilibria,
learning to coordinate on one of them can be very difficult.
An important conclusion from our analysis, that partially contradicts results from evolutionary
game theory and learning dynamics based on imitation (9; 10), is that network’s sparseness and
degree fluctuations do not necessarily favor the emergence of collaboration. In fact, the set of
constraints imposed by control-and-punishment relations can be much more difficult to satisfy in
sparse graphs than in dense groups. This is somehow in agreement with experimental observation
(11; 13), that measured systematically higher contribution levels in cliques and dense groups than
in circular or linear arrangements.
The analysis of collaborative equilibria on different topologies suggests that the global prop-
erties of typical collaborative equilibria do not change considerably on different sparse networks.
However, the local properties inside a network can be very different. This is evident in heteroge-
neous networks, where high-degree nodes have a considerably larger probability to collaborate than
low degree ones. The result is in agreement with predictions of evolutionary game theory (10) and
with experimental results obtained comparing the contribution levels of central and peripheral
nodes in star-like graphs (13). It also reminds the idea, firstly proposed by Haag and Lagunoff
(37), of the existence of an uncollaborative fringe of agents connected to a collaborative core that
can tolerate them. This picture is particularly true when considering heterogeneous networks with
assortative mixing. On the contrary, in networks with negative degree correlations collaboration
can be problematic, because of the mismatch between the conditions on high-degree nodes and the
neighboring low-degree ones.
We conclude with a note on a recent experiment (38) on the absence of social contagion with
respect to collaborative behavior. Social contagion refers to the idea (20) that some personal
behaviors (as the inclination to collaborate) may be transmitted via social networks. Suri and
Watts (38) find that increasing the number of collaborating neighbors does not directly imply a
larger probability to collaborate (and vice versa). Our model provides a theoretical foundation
for such an observation. In fact, strategic conditional collaboration requires a precise number of
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collaborating neighbors and when the level of collaboration in the neighborhood is too high the
temptation to free-ride takes over. On the other hand, for sufficiently large costs, a collaborative
state can be destroyed because of a single deviation, that may induce a cascade effect over the
network.
In summary, we have put forward a new framework to study the emergence of collaboration on
networks, that is completely based on assumptions drawn from the experimental observations and
on a rational forward-looking strategic behavior. Our results provide a theoretical explanation to
a series of important empirical facts, and could motivate other experiments on repeated voluntary
contribution games in networked systems. It provides insights in the analysis of strictly strategic
problems, such as coalition formation, contractual agreements, and negotiation.
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